The Eurozone as a Vehicle towards German Institutional Hegemony: Evidence from Economic and International Relations Theory

(Το παρόν κείμενο αποτελεί προϊόν προσωπικής ακαδημαϊκής προσπάθειας στα πλαίσια του μεταπτυχιακού μου στη θεωρία των Διεθνών Σχέσεων. Λάθη και παραλείψεις βαρύνουν αποκλειστικά τον υποφαινόμενο) 

The aim of this essay is to present the case of the Euro being a tool towards German Institutional Hegemony. First we will show the mechanisms through which the current crisis initiated and then we’ll show how the structure of the Euro is designed to augment German economic power. We’ll make a presentation of Optimal Currency Areas and how the Euro compares to that. Then with the aid of International Relations Theory we’ll use a systemic approach towards the Euro and how this aids Germany’s bid for regional hegemony.

It is often said that the current economic crisis is the worst to hit the global economy since 1929. Decision makers around the world often use this cliché in order to explain why the global economy is not moving towards a more stable growth path. Governments and Central Bankers around the world state that since the 1929 crisis we have learned and we’re bound not to repeat the same mistakes. And yet some mistakes are not only repeated but they’re being aggravated by indecision and pro cyclical measures that are being advocated.

Taking the case of the Euro zone we can say with a certain degree of confidence that what begun as a financial crisis in 2008, has escalated into a full blown liquidity crisis which bears all the hallmarks of a speculative attack. This liquidity crisis has as its main actors the member states of the Euro zone and more specifically, the so called PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain) which are faced with increasing difficulties with respect to their debt refinancing. From an economic viewpoint the mechanism which is the driving force behind the ongoing speculative attack is rather straight forward. For various reasons, investors consider the public debt that they’re holding as a riskier asset than in the recent past. This triggers a sale on these assets which forces the interest rate with which states borrow upwards by imposing a risk premium on it. This increase in the interest rate can be particularly devastating for states which are vulnerable to such changes, such as countries which belong to the PIIGS group that have already amassed a considerable amount of public debt. Normally this wouldn’t present a problem because when a country is faced with such a crisis, the central bank steps in and buys public debt in exchange for printed money. Thus the crisis is alleviated in exchange for an increase in inflation and public debt but in general a liquidity crisis is avoided and the speculative attack stopped.

In the case of the PIIGS group however what started out as a simple ripple in the surface may well turn out into a full fledged tsunami leading to state bankruptcies and severe economic recession. Again the mechanism for this is pretty straight forward. With the introduction of the Euro, the countries of the European south suddenly had at their disposal a solid currency backed by the powerful, export oriented economies of the north. Using this currency as collateral they increased public and private spending fueling the economic boom of 2001 -2008. These states could get away with this behavior because both private and public debt was issued in the new, robust currency. Investors considered such debt to be secure and this allowed for lower interest rates. With variations (Ireland’s explosive banking growth, Spain’s housing boom, Portugal’s, Greece’s and Italy’s public debt explosion) these states massed public debt by running considerable deficits which in turn fueled domestic consumption causing inflation and overheating. In some cases (Greece in particular) the explosion in domestic consumption and private credit caused a massive increase in imports thus creating the so called “twin” deficits (budget and balance of payments). As long as the investors considered the debt assets issued by the states as secure there were no clouds in the horizon and the system worked smoothly. Problems arose when, under the shock of the subprime crisis, investors started to sell off riskier assets to move towards safe havens such as US T – Bills or German Bonds. In addition to the rising premium on public borrowing, bonds which were already under circulation steadily lost their liquidity. Because private banks considered such assets as fully liquid, this chain of events forced them to shut down the flow of private credit thus aggravating an already bad situation. The ECB, lacking the ability to increase monetary supply by exchanging undervalued state debt for fresh money, opted instead to continue using depreciated assets held by the banking sector as collateral in order to ease the liquidity crisis. This however has proven to be only a stop gap measure as private banks and national pension funds have exhausted their capability to scoop up state debt. The joint response of the IMF – Eurozone countries has proven so far to be ineffective, since the rescue packages for Greece, Ireland and Portugal are accompanied by severe austerity measures which act as accelerators in a self fulfilling prophecy cycle. The only measure which would alleviate the speculative attacks on the weaker members of the Euro, the so called Eurobond, has been vehemently rejected by Germany on the grounds of moral hazard. The moral hazard proponents state that it is improper to ask the taxpayers of countries that enjoy sound fiscal conditions to shoulder the burden of countries which pursued irresponsible economic behavior. Irresponsible economic behavior should be punished by making those countries see the error of their judgment. This line of thought, while certainly holding considerable truth in it, first of all fails to address the immediate problem at hand and moreover, by letting these irresponsible countries fail, the risk of triggering a global economic crisis of far greater proportions than the subprime collapse is greatly increased. The Eurobond solution would allow member states to exchange part of their public debt for commonly issued Euro zone bonds. These would have a very favorable risk rating and if combined with the empowerment of the ECB to exchange them for fresh money supply directly, this would spell the end of the monopoly that the market has as the sole buyer of Euro zone public debt.

Germany, backed by other northern states such as Holland, Finland and Austria, has refused to even consider such a plan. If we leave the realm of economics and enter those of International Relations, this is perfectly normal and rational behavior, in full accordance with German national interest. Before we go any further in our analysis, we need to explain what the concept of an Optimal Currency Area is and how the Euro zone compares to that.   

An Optimal Currency Area is a geographic region in which economic efficiency is maximized under a common currency. This geographical region does not always coincide with the borders of a nation state. Indeed, from an economic viewpoint it can be argued that the United States is not an Optimal Currency Area and that certain regions would benefit more from the introduction of a local currency. For a currency area to be optimal there are several criteria which have to be satisfied:

• Labour Mobility: This translates as the ability of workers to move freely from one region of the currency area to another. This movement allows the relocation of workers from an area hit by recession and unemployment to an area of high growth.
• Capital Mobility: This allows the market forces to distribute money and goods to where they’re needed the most.
• Price and Wage flexibility: If the two criteria above are to be successfully met price and wage flexibility are an absolutely necessary ingredient. Sticky prices and wages inhibit both capital and labour mobility.
• Risk Sharing Mechanism: This translates as a fiscal transfer mechanism redistributing tax revenue to areas which are adversely affected by the first two criteria. Such a mechanism mitigates the effects of an economic crisis or a recession.
• Similar Business Cycles: When one area is experiencing a boom whilst another is in the throws of a recession it’s very difficult for the monetary authority to adopt an optimal policy for both.
• Production Diversification: When different regions produce different goods and services, a common currency area greatly reduces interregional trading costs and risks thus facilitating growth.
• Homogeneous Preferences: This means that the various regions comprising the currency area have similar expectations from their monetary authority, for example, to keep prices stable at all costs.
• Commonality of Destiny: The regions which comprise the currency area feel that they are bound together in a common cause. When one region is in trouble the others will try to help it out.

If we were to apply the above scorecard to the Euro zone area we would find it lacking in several aspects. Labor mobility is very low and all this despite the abolition of physical restriction on travel and relocation. In addition, there are cultural barriers (multitude of languages and cultures) which hinder labor movements. Capital mobility has been achieved but in several states prices and wages are sticky (Greece) which causes an outflow of capital from these states to others which are more efficient. Therefore capital mobility turns into a liability instead of being an asset. A risk sharing mechanism has been explicitly banned from the Euro zone by its founding treaties. The ECB is under no circumstances allowed to purchase public debt in exchange for an increase in monetary circulation. The ongoing debt crisis has caused a de facto shift in this approach, as the hasty conjuring of the EFSF mechanism shows. The inclusion of a risk premium for private bond holders though, practically negates any positive effects from the transfer of EFSF funds to crisis stricken states. Of a more fundamental nature is the lack of common business cycles between the Euro zone states. This and the absence of any meaningful convergence mechanisms between the states force the ECB to pursue suboptimal policies. The recent rise in the ECB interest rate signifies just that; whereas Germany feels threatened from a possible inflationary burst, the states of the south desperately need low interest rates to rekindle their stagnating economies. This issue goes hand in hand with what the states expect from the ECB; Germany wants the ECB as a mirror image of the Bundesbank. The southern states expect a central bank with a more intervening role in the European economy. The German psyche has been marred by the hyperinflation episode of the 20s and therefore desires strict price control. This approach causes the rift in productivity between the countries of the north and those of the south to widen further still. Stable prices and tight inflation controls mean that, all else being equal, productivity will flow from the south to the north thus exacerbating the problem. As for the commonality of our destiny, all recent polling data suggest a major disappointment from the EU experiment as it is.

We come to the conclusion therefore that the Euro zone as it is set up today is far from being an optimal currency area. If we were to see things from a different perspective however, we would see that it’s the perfect instrument in the pursuit of power. It is at this point that we must lay down several facts which govern the system of states.

• States are the key actors in an anarchic world. This means that there is no higher authority, no arbitrator above the states which can meditate between them.
• States inhabit a competitive world. All states strive to increase their power relative to other states. States are driven to this behavior because they fear for their survival. And survival is the premier goal for all states.
• The system of states is one of self – help. For states to achieve their primary goal of survival, they have to increase their relative power. To this end, states should undertake all necessary measures to optimize their power output from all available resources (internal balancing). Additionally, states can try to team up with other states in alliances in order to increase their sense of security (external balancing). It is obvious, that given a choice, internal balancing is preferable to external balancing because an internal balancing process is fully under the state’s control.

To take things a bit further, it is necessary to cast a closer look in the policies of greater states, the so called great powers. John J. Mearsheimer in his seminal work “The tragedy of Great Power Politics” puts forth the theory of offensive realism through which he offers a clarifying explanation on how great powers operate within the system of states. Mearsheimer makes the following assumptions:

·        States are the principal actors of the system.

·        All states have some offensive capability

·    There is always uncertainty about other states’ intentions. It’s difficult to gauge a state’s intentions and nigh on impossible to discern future intentions.

·        The highest goal of the state is survival

·        States are rational actors

The quest for survival in addition to systemic uncertainty causes states to fear each other. Fear drives state to amass as much power as they possibly can; it’s the only way through which they can feel secure. The safest possible position in which a state can be is that of a regional hegemon i.e. that where a single state dominates a greater geographical region and influences others. The United States are considered to be the regional hegemon of the western hemisphere as they not only dominating the Americas but they also exert considerable influence upon North East Asia and Europe.  A regional hegemon does not wish to have peers and therefore when a competitor looms in the horizon the hegemon will do its utmost to humble him.

This then provides us with a very good explanation for recent historical events in Europe. Since its unification in 1871, Germany has strived to become a regional hegemon in Europe. Twice Germany has been defeated in a contest of military power, both times due to the decisive intervention of overseas balancers. In both world wars, it was the intervention of the UK and the US which ultimately caused the defeat of Germany. In this analysis, we will be making the case that Germany is once more seeking the position of regional hegemon. There is nothing malevolent in this behavior because states do not conform to the ethical code which applies to individuals. It is the very nature of the great power and the system of the states that force it to pursue the Sisyphean task of hegemony. This time Germany is not trying to achieve this position through sheer military power; the introduction of nuclear arms has made this contest much less feasible than before, at least as far as great powers are concerned. Instead, Germany, by flexing its economic might is seeking to institutionally dominate Europe by creating a system of satellite states which are economically dependent on her for survival. It can be said that this institutional hegemonism replicates in a way the feudal system of the Middle Ages where the fiefdoms swore fealty to the baron. The baron had the obligation to provide security for his lieges while they had the obligation to provide him with taxes; either in monetary or other form (i.e. serving in the baron’s army).

Let us make the following assumption; the Euro was created as a currency to cater primarily to the needs of Germany. The ECB was given a strict mandate to oversee price stability which greatly benefits countries that have a lead in productivity. By not allowing for an effective convergence mechanism and an appropriate risk sharing mechanism the Germans condemned the weaker economies to economic obliteration. True enough, whilst countries of the north (Germany, Holland, Finland, Austria and to a lesser degree France) strove to minimize the cost of production and maximize productivity, states which already had a poor record in this department, deteriorated even further. All that was needed was an external shock to act as a spark plug for the ensuing liquidity crisis.

From an economic point of view the best solution to the current crisis would be the issuing of the Euro bond. This would immediately deflate speculative attacks against state debt by allowing the ECB to trade Euro bonds for a fresh supply of money. This should be accompanied by a Euro zone fiscal governance body which should impose tight controls on the issuing of common Euro zone debt. This must act as a reign to irresponsible public spending of member states which, through their own actions, put their countries in such dire straits. Furthermore, only part of state debt should be converted to Euro Bonds thus further restraining states from runaway spending. Should states wish to accrue further debt they can do so by issuing state bonds at a significant risk premium.

The opposing view states that countries which keep their economies in proper order should not be forced to pay for the inaction or mishandling of other countries (moral hazard). In the end, Euro zone member states together with the IMF have ended bailing out Greece, Portugal and Ireland with billions of Euros in emergency loans. On one hand, the northern states wish to punish fiscally irresponsible states by imposing very high lending rates and crushing austerity measures. On the other hand, they very much fear a possible domino of bankruptcies and continue pouring money towards those countries. From an economic point of view, this is as efficient as pouring money down the drain. The austerity measures fuel severe recessions which in turn require even more loans, which require even more austerity in a never ending downward spiral. The offering of emergency loans does not answer the fundamental problem which is the monopoly of the market as a buyer of public debt and the inability of these countries to increase the monetary supply to ease the liquidity crisis. So long as speculators know this fundamental fact to hold as the truth, they will attack again and again in the future.

If we were to change observation platforms and view this from the scope of International Relations Theory, we can clearly say that this is an optimal move on the part of Germany. Germany, under no circumstances wants to relinquish its hold over the ECB. It does not wish to cause mortal damage to the countries of the south; it merely wishes to keep them constantly depraved and in need of northern funds. Germany is quite sincere when it says that it does not wish for Greece to go bankrupt. She wants Greece (and for that matter all other countries of the PIIGS group) to be in the Euro, at a constant productivity disadvantage, in a situation of constant need for emergency funds. It is clear as daylight that at least Greece’s public debt is no longer serviceable, yet Germany facilitates talks for further loans made available. Therefore we conclude that Germany is leveraging its considerable economic power in order to realize its goal of dominance with the EU, hence the term institutional hegemonism. This is perfectly rational behavior on the part of Germany and in full accordance with their national interests. Germany is simply behaving as it must by acquiring power in its bid for hegemony and hence security. If we were to look for a historic parallel to this situation we can offer the example of the Delian League. The Delian League was founded in 477 BC as a collective security organization of the Greek city states against the Persian threat. Its original goal was to offer security to its member states and to continue the war against the Persians. The League’s treasury and congressional meetings where held in the sacred island of Delos which was considered neutral ground by all participants. In 454 BC, Pericles moved the treasury and the seat of the League to Athens and begun using the League’s treasury and military assets in pursuit of Athenian state interests. Any insubordination towards the will of Athens was dealt with swiftly and heavy handed. Thucydides, in an excerpt which is considered the basis of scientific research for International Relations, offers us a dialogue between the Athenian delegates and those of the island of Melos. The island of Melos was populated by Spartan colonists who resented the Athenian yoke. Athens threatened Melos with military retaliation should it refuse to join the League. The Melians stated that it was unethical on the part of Athens to threaten such a small state. The Athenian delegates responded that it was unethical of the Melian leaders to subject their citizens to Athenian reprisals. If Melos desired an independent status it should have acquired the means with which to pursue such a policy.

The above paradigm sheds light to many economic decisions which at first light appear suboptimal. The implications for a country entering the Euro zone where well known and documented since before its inception. When a state surrenders willingly part of its authority (monetary policy) it must have a very clear vision of what it wishes to achieve and how it plans to offset this loss with other benefits. When a state wishes to partake in an association of states it must do so with the full knowledge that the governing rules are those of the greater states. As Thucydides said, it is unethical for a state to subject its people to punishment due to poor preparation on its part. Greece and other countries of the south knew full well the implications of joining the Euro club. The leaderships knew or should have known that they were entering a club in which their countries where inferior in productivity, a club in which they would have to emulate German economic behavior in order to survive. Countries which did so benefited from the productivity transfer and utilized the Euro to enhance their own power. States which saw the Euro as the key to the Eldorado of cheap money are realizing to their horror that they will have to pay back that money and much more. There is no such thing as a free meal in the world we inhabit and on that both economic and international relations theory agree. In a self help system of states what matters the most is what the state does or neglects to do. A state which believes in Divine Intervention or in the good intentions of others cannot possibly hope to survive. As the ancient Greeks so eloquently said: «Συν Αθηνά και χείρα κίνει». You cannot wait for the miracle; you have to take actions your self.

Bibliography

Economic Theory

1. Alessina A.; Barro R.J.; Tenreyro S. (July 2002) “Optimal Currency Areas”, NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper 9072
2. Aliber R. Z (November 1972) “Uncertainty, Currency Areas and the Exchange Rate System”, Economica, 39(156), 432-441
3. Ching S.; Devereux M.B (July 2000) “Risk sharing and the theory of optimal currency Areas: A re-examination of Mundell (1973)”
4. Cooper R.N; Hall R.E (1990) “European Monetary Reform: Progress and Prospects. Comments and Discussion”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1990(2), 275-291
5. Corsetti G.; Pesenti P. (1999) “Stability, Asymmetry and Discontinuity: The Launch of European Monetary Union”, Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, 1999(2), 295-358
6. Currie D. (March 1992) “European Monetary Union: Institutional Structure and Economic Performance”, The Economic Journal, 102(411), 248-264
7. De Grauwe P. (April 2011) “The Governance of a Fragile Eurozone”, CEPS Working Paper
8. McKinnon R.I (September 1963) “Optimum Currency Areas”, The American Economic Review, 53(4), 717-725
9. Mundell R.A (September 1961) “A Theory of Optimal Currency Areas”, The American Economic Review, 51(4), 657-665
10. Walsh Carl E., Monetary Theory and Policy, Cambridge, Massachussets, 2003, MIT Press

International Relations Theory

1. Carr, Edward H., The Twenty Years’ Crisis, London, 2001, Palgrave Macmillan
2. Holsti Kalevi J., “The necrologists of International Relations” Canadian Journal Of Political Science, 18 (4)
3. Kissinger, Henry, Diplomacy, New York, 2003, Simon & Schuster Paperbacks
4. Mearsheimer, John J., The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York, 2001, Norton Publishing
5. Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics, Long Grove, Illinois, 2010, Waveland Press Inc.
6. Wight, Martin, Διεθνής Θεωρία: Τα τρία ρεύματα σκέψης, Αθήνα, 2005 (Γ΄ έκδοση), Εκδόσεις Ποιότητα
7. Ήφαιστος, Παναγιώτης, Διπλωματία και Στρατηγική των Μεγάλων Ευρωπαϊκών Δυνάμεων, Αθήνα, Εκδόσεις Ποιότητα
8. Κονδύλης, Παναγιώτης, Θεωρία του Πολέμου, Αθήνα, 1997, Θεμέλιο

9.     Κονδύλης, Παναγιώτης, Οι Αιτίες της Παρακμής της Σύγχρονης Ελλάδας, Αθήνα, 2011, Θεμέλιο

10.  Κουσκουβέλης, Ηλίας Ι., Εισαγωγή στις Διεθνείς Σχέσεις, Αθήνα, 2007, Εκδόσεις Ποιότητα

11. Λίτσας, Σπυρίδων, Πόλεμος και Ορθολογισμός: Θεωρητικές Προεκτάσεις και Στρατηγικές Εφαρμογές, Αθήνα 2010, Εκδόσεις Ποιότητα

Ατενίζοντας την άβυσσο

Ο τίτλος του σημερινού κειμένου είναι μαύρος όσο και η διάθεση μας τις τελευταίες μέρες. Με αφορμή την απόφαση για διενέργεια δημοψηφίσματος σχετικά με τη νέα δανειακή σύμβαση, καταλήγουμε στο λυπηρό συμπέρασμα ότι οι κυβερνήτες της χώρας έχουν απομακρυνθεί ολοσχερώς από τη σφαίρα της λογικής και του ορθολογισμού. Αντίθετα, αναζητώντας μια οδό διαφυγής από την ηλεκτρική καρέκλα της ηγεσίας επιλέγουν τη Μανιχαϊστική θεώρηση ενός δημοψηφίσματος. Λευκό εναντίον Μαύρου, Ευρώπη εναντίον Βαλκανίων, Ευρώ ή Δραχμή, είστε μαζί μου ή είστε εναντίον μου, αν είστε εναντίον μου σας σέρνω μαζί μου στην καταστροφή. Προσωπικά είμαι αντίθετος στη λογική των δημοψηφισμάτων γιατί είναι σπάνια τα παραδείγματα στην ανθρώπινη ιστορία όπου τα προβλήματα έχουν μόνο δύο όψεις. Είναι αντίθετα πολλά τα παραδείγματα όπου αντιδημοκρατικές αποφάσεις νομιμοποιήθηκαν με το μανδύα ενός δημοψηφίσματος. Το κυριότερο πρόβλημα με ένα δημοψήφισμα, είναι ότι ο πληθυσμός ενεργεί συνήθως υπό το καθεστώς της ψυχολογίας του όχλου, με διάθεση δηλαδή όχι να απαντήσει στο ερώτημα αλλά σε αυτόν που θέτει το ερώτημα. Ο κύριος Παπανδρέου επιχειρεί να θέσει στην κυβερνητική πλειοψηφία και στον ελληνικό λαό αυτό που ο κύριος John Major (πρώην πρωθυπουργός του Ηνωμένου Βασιλείου) είχε εύγλωττα περιγράψει ως εξής: “either put up or shut up”. Δηλαδή, ή ρίξτε με ή βγάλτε το σκασμό. Παίζοντας μια προσωπική παρτίδα πόκερ υψηλού ρίσκου επάνω στις πλάτες της χώρας, ο κύριος Παπανδρέου επιχειρεί να αποκτήσει άλλοθι για να καλύψει την προσωπική του ανεπάρκεια. Είναι μάλλον όψιμο και φαιδρό από έναν άνθρωπο που εκστόμισε το «λεφτά υπάρχουν» να ανακαλύπτει ξαφνικά δυσαρμονία λαϊκού αισθήματος και πολιτικού συσχετισμού. Προκαλεί θυμηδία η επίκληση στα πατριωτικά και δημοκρατικά καθήκοντα των πολιτών. Τώρα τα θυμήθηκε αυτά ο κύριος Παπανδρέου; Δεν αντιλαμβάνεται την κρισιμότητα της κατάστασης; Και εν πάση περιπτώσει, κανείς δεν τον υποχρέωσε (;) να αναλάβει πρωθυπουργός, κανείς δεν τον εμποδίζει να παραιτηθεί αν δεν μπορεί να συνεχίσει. Υπό τις παρούσες συνθήκες, μια εκλογική αναμέτρηση σε σύντομο χρονικό διάστημα θα πρόσφερε καλύτερες υπηρεσίες στη χώρα μας. Το διακύβευμα είναι σαφέστατο και ο καθένας μπορεί να αναλάβει τις ευθύνες του.

Έτσι για την ιστορία, να αναφέρουμε μερικά μόνο από τα αρνητικά ενός δημοψηφίσματος στην παρούσα φάση:

  

Άνευ λόγου και ουσίας το ερώτημα που τίθεται, οι εταίροι μας δεν μας ρωτούν αν θέλουμε τη συγκεκριμένη λύση, μας την επιβάλλουν. Καλή ή κακή αυτή είναι. Η εναλλακτική είναι ανεξέλεγκτη χρεοκοπία. Σε τελική ανάλυση, είναι σαν να ρωτάς κάποιον αν θέλει να πεθάνει από πνιγμό ή από ηλεκτροπληξία. Το δημοψήφισμα, αν έπρεπε να είχε γίνει, θα έπρεπε να πραγματοποιηθεί πριν το πρώτο μνημόνιο για να μπορεί να χρησιμέψει και σαν διαπραγματευτικό ατού στις διαπραγματεύσεις. Τότε, που είχε ακόμα κάποιο νόημα ένα επιθετικό κούρεμα των ελληνικών ομολόγων.

Είναι ανήθικη η προσπάθεια που γίνεται να διαχυθεί η ευθύνη για αποφάσεις που έλαβε ο κύριος Παπανδρέου, προς το σύνολο του πληθυσμού (moral hazard). Αν ο κύριος Παπανδρέου αισθάνεται ότι δεν μπορεί να κυβερνήσει λόγω του χάους και της παραλυσίας που προκαλούν «σκοτεινά συμφέροντα (αμάν πια αυτά τα σκοτεινά συμφέροντα!), το παρασκήνιο και οι μειοψηφίες» είναι πολύ πιο έντιμο να αποχωρήσει. Μπορεί να προτείνει κυβέρνηση εθνικής σωτηρίας ή να προκηρύξει εκλογές.

Εκτίθεται ανεπανόρθωτα η ήδη σοβαρά καταρρακωμένη εικόνα της χώρας μας στο εξωτερικό. Οι ηγέτες της Ευρωζώνης κατέβαλαν σημαντικές προσπάθειες τόσο για να καταλήξουν στο προϊόν συμβιβασμού της 26^ης Οκτωβρίου, όσο και για να πείσουν την κοινή γνώμη των χωρών τους για την αναγκαιότητα της όποιας στήριξης προς την Ελλάδα. Και ερχόμαστε τώρα εμείς να αμφισβητήσουμε αυτή τη συμφωνία (την οποία «διαπραγματεύτηκε» ο κύριος Παπανδρέου κατά τα λεγόμενα του) μέσα από την αβεβαιότητα ενός δημοψηφίσματος. Ποιός ηγέτης θα συναινέσει να μας δανείσουν περεταίρω μέσα σε αυτό το καθεστώς αβεβαιότητας; Βασικός στόχος των κρατών είναι η επιβίωση τους. Για να επιτευχθεί αυτό το κράτος χρειάζεται φορτία ισχύος. Τα κράτη είτε προσπαθούν με δικές τους ενέργειες να αυξήσουν την ισχύ τους είτε προσπαθούν μέσω συμμαχιών να επιτύχουν το ίδιο αποτέλεσμα. Εμείς με την απόφαση αυτή φροντίσαμε να κλονίσουμε σοβαρά την εμπιστοσύνη των συμμάχων ή εταίρων μας ως προς εμάς.

Είναι πάγια αρχή στην οικονομική επιστήμη αλλά και στη θεωρία λήψης των αποφάσεων να μην λαμβάνεις αποφάσεις οι οποίες αυξάνουν την αβεβαιότητα. Η αβεβαιότητα προκαλεί σύγχυση και καθιστά τη λήψη της απόφασης δυσκολότερη. Η σύγχυση αυξάνει το φόβο και τη δυσπιστία των κρατών και τα οδηγεί ευκολότερα σε αποφάσεις μη βέλτιστες ως προς τα μακροπρόθεσμα συμφέροντα τους. Ο δε φόβος και η αβεβαιότητα αυτοτροφοδοτούν ένα σπιράλ το οποίο συχνά οδηγεί στην κρίση και τη σύγκρουση.