Syria and the resurfacing of the Eastern Question

The ongoing civil war in Syria brings to focus the 19^th century Eastern Question albeit in a different setting. Then, we had the scramble of the Great Powers over the carcass of what once was the might Ottoman Empire. The vacuum created by the “sick man of Europe” led to all kinds of destabilizing crisis both in the Balkans and in the Middle East, until finally the First World War erupted sparked by “a silly thing in the Balkans” as Bismarck had prophesized. In a more recent light of historical events, the Middle East had been stabilized post World War Two along cold war lines; on one hand we had Israel and US backed Arabic monarchies and on the other hand we had Soviet backed secular “republics” (read dictatorships). Things would occasionally flare up but everything was kept under strict control. Then, after the Yom Kippur war in 1973, the Egyptians threw in the towel and switched sides; from a Soviet bastion in the Middle East they transformed themselves to one of the staunchest US allies. That left Syria rather isolated but everyone was happy with the result. From Morocco to Iran, every nation had a stable pro-US dictatorship (or monarchy, take your pick). Exceptions such as Libya and Syria where in effect sidelined and contained. Even after the 1979 revolution in Iran the US quickly managed to stabilize and contain the situation by adhering to that age old maxim “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” (Iraq).

Everyone was happy with these arrangements; The USSR had its allies (Libya and Syria); the US had its allies (Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq). Iran was successfully contained and engaged by Iraq (under heavy sponsoring from the US). In 1990 Iraq got greedy and invaded Kuwait. Order was promptly restored and the then US administration opted to keep Saddam Hussein in power as a bulwark against Iranian pressures. The administration also came to the conclusion that there was no clear exit strategy or succession should Saddam be ousted from power. Some felt that this constituted unfinished business and that led to the catastrophic Gulf War round two. This sequel provides us with useful insights of what not to do when planning a military operation and in general shows us clearly what happens when the political objectives are out of touch with reality. Under various vague notions of protecting the world from grave danger (Weapons of Mass Destruction, WMD), of uprooting Al Qaeda terrorist cells (completely false accusation) and of promoting freedom and democracy in the Middle East a sovereign state was invaded. The military operations where naturally a cake walk, the end game though proved a different matter altogether. WMDs where never found although the US sponsored dictatorship did harbor and use them during the Iran – Iraq war in the 80s. Al Qaeda was never found to have cells in Iraq despite extensive use of torture (Abu Ghraib prison) which should have been a no-brainer in the first place; Iraq was a secular dictatorship where women enjoyed considerable rights. Baghdad even had a synagogue and there were Christian churches. Civil laws were used instead of the Islamic law practiced in Saudi Arabia. These are features to which Al Qaeda is entirely antithetical to and the assumed linkage between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden is but a figment of imagination. As for those advocating democracy and freedom, the ensuing civil war between the various factions in Iraq proved how difficult it is to promote democracy to a society which hasn't gone through the necessary transformations in order to foster such a change. We also need to keep in mind that Iraq is an artificially created state where highly heterogeneous ethnic and religious groups coexisted uneasily under the tyranny of Saddam Hussein.

Moving fast forward, we stumble upon the events unfolding after the eruption of the “Arabic Spring”. Through seemingly unconnected events beginning with protests in Tunisia (December 2010) a chain reaction started which swept away the cold war secular dictatorships from the region. All of the regimes which fell where, in various degrees, within the US sphere of influence. The Obama administration decided that these cold war relics had overrun their usefulness and went so far as to military intervene in Libya and push Mubarak towards an inglorious exit. While it is certainly true that these regimes had been considerably eroded by decades in power, by extensive corruption and nepotism and by being completely out of touch with the needs of their people, it is also true that the US strategy concerning their succession was flawed. The current administration tried to do the “democratic winds of change” on the cheap without ground forces being involved and failed. Proof of this “change of heart” is the reinstating of a military dictatorship in Egypt, a crucial US ally in the Middle East. This is the price which has to be paid when you try to liberalize realist policy objectives. In Syria however, once again policy objectives are out of touch with reality. US policy has been undermined by conflicting and counterproductive objectives, by ignoring facts on the ground and by basing policy on hopes rather than facts. We find a shocking lack of a long term strategy and the similarities with Iraq are chilling. Again we have a tirade about WMDs, red lines being crossed (does this remind anyone of “smoking guns” as was the case in Iraq?) and the plight of innocent democratic citizens being brutalized by the regime. And I ask you here: since when did the US or any other Great Power for that matter give a damn about human rights violations, dictatorships trampling democratic rights, WMDs and so on? The question is of course rhetoric; these pretexts and beliefs (“the right to protect”) are being used as methods of creating external and internal legitimacy for the achievement of policy objectives. The thing is that these arguments in favor of a military intervention in Syria have rapidly grown stale. The people may have a short attention span and may be subjected to daily doses of propaganda by the mass media, but the fiasco of the Iraq invasion is historically too close to be forgotten. The basic problem with a military intervention in Syria is one of succession. That is, what will happen to the country once Assad has left the scene? Civil wars can be nasty affairs and intervening in one directly can be even nastier. Right now we have the Assad regime which is firmly reliant upon Iranian help in order to survive. Russia merely uses the Syrian problem in order to score some cheap diplomatic points against the US and not because they have any great love for Assad. Their interests would be somewhat hurt should he be gone because weapons customers are always good friends but other than that there is not much of critical strategic value for them there. In short, he’s a useful nuisance towards the US, a customer of their weapons and that’s about it. Should push come to shove, the Russians will not risk their necks offering direct or indirect military aid towards Syria. So, the US wants to depose Syria because they’re the key Iranian ally in the region. Should Assad be deposed what will become of Syria? Will Iranian influence wax or wane? Will there be order or chaos for years to come? Will it be a stable country or will it become a failed state like Iraq, a terrorist playground for all interested. How are US interests best served in the region? To whom the profits from a military intervention?

Syria is an artificial state just like Iraq is. Different ethnic and religious groups co-exist under an enforced minority dictatorship. Destabilizing the current regime will most certainly open Pandora’s Box. Even Israel is reluctant to see a regime change in Damascus under current circumstances. With Assad what they see is what they get; with a country in an endless civil war no one is in control. And power vacuums are very bad things when it comes to the relations between states. Israel (and any rational thinker for that matter) rightly believes that a destabilized Syria will increase Iranian influence in the region, not decrease it. Assad has every reason to behave rationally when it comes to limiting Iranian influence; he wants to survive so he keeps things under relative control and limit. Without a strong authority and a country descending into faction warfare how will anyone limit the influence of fanatics on all sides? Or does the US believe it can control the fanatics it currently uses as pawns in this civil war? The events in Lybia and Egypt suggest that Muslim fundamentalism is very difficult to control once left out of the box. And there is yet another question; how would a fragile world economy profit from violent fluctuations caused in oil and other markets by a military intervention in Syria? Military interventions are serious events and anyone thinking that a 3 day bombing campaign in Syria will make all problems magically vanish is simply being naïve. During World War Two, the US administration had been planning about the governance of post war Germany two years prior the fall of the Third Reich. Considerable thinking and resources had been poured into this project and the manpower involved was in the thousands. And in both Germany and Japan we’re talking about first world countries with homogenous populations and historical institutions to fall back upon. In Iraq, post war planning was left to about a hundred people (ORHA) with no resources or authority and minimal time to plan ahead. Iraq and Syria are artificial nations created in the twilight of European imperialism, without homogeneity or any common destiny or history of their populace. What does the US wish to achieve by intervening? What is the long term plan and strategy? What are the policy objectives? Personally, I believe that an intervention in Syria opens a very big can of worms leading to yet another failed state in the region. What will happen if all those alleged chemicals find their way towards Hezbollah and are then launched upon Israel via Lebanon? Assad is rational enough never to do such a thing, but should he fear his end is near what will stop him from spreading such weaponry indiscriminately? The military option towards Syria is being pursued in order to preserve the right of the United States to intervene anywhere in the world under liberal-Wilsonian pretexts without the formalities of the UN. I fear however that these Wilsonian pretexts are becoming a purpose in their own right instead of a means to an end. The specter of the Munich agreement (1938) is being used as justification for intervention without prior deliberation. The distortion of facts and the absence of rational policy objectives are much more damaging in the long term than any preemptive intervention.